Documentos secretos Cuba e Angola: Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive today posted a selection of secret Cuban government documents detailing Cuba's policy and involvement in Africa in the 1960s and 1970s. (Fonte: The National Security Archive)
F. Castro decidiu enviar tropas para Angola, no dia 4 de novembro de 1975, em resposta à invasão Sul-africana e não vice-versa como a administração Ford persistentemente reivindicada;
EUA sabia sobre os planos de invasão secreta da África do Sul e militarmente colaborou com as suas tropas, ao contrário do que Secretário de Estado Henry Kissinger testemunhou perante o Congresso e escreveu em suas memórias.
Cuba tomou a decisão de enviar tropas sem informar a URSS, ao contrário do que foi amplamente alegado, sem qualquer ajuda Soviética nos primeiros dois meses
Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
| Document 1 | ||
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January 13, 1976, Department of State Cable, “Cuban Military Intervention in Angola: Report Number 9.” (Document obtained from Department of State files through FOIA). | |
The Department of State reports on the Soviet flights of Cubans to Angola. “Cuba may have begun to use 200 passenger capacity IL-62 aircrafts (Soviet) in its airlift support operations.” The document also makes estimates on the number of Cubans fighting in Angola, and speculates on possible military maneuvers to occur in the near future.
| Document 2 | ||
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January 6, 1976, Memorandum from Cuban Army, “Conversation with the Soviet Ambassador.” (Document from the Centro de Informacion de la Defensa de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, CIDFAR, [Center of Information of the Armed Forces]). | |
| English translation of this document | ||
In this memorandum a high ranking Cuban military official describes a meeting with Vitali Vorotnikov, Soviet Ambassador to Cuba, in which he informs Raúl Castro that Aeroflot will provide ten charter flights to fly Cubans into Angola. Most other countries had refused the Cubans landing rights under pressure from the United States. The Soviets offered these ten flights, but no more.
| Document 3 | ||
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December 18, 1975, Cable from Arquimides Columbié, [Political Situation in Angola]. (Document from the Centro de Informacion de la Defensa de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, CIDFAR, [Center of Information of the Armed Forces]). | |
| English translation of this document | ||
Arquimides Columbié, the highest ranking Cuban civilian in Africa during the Angolan war, cables Havana describing a meeting with a Soviet source that shows the USSR’s profound mistrust of the MPLA. The source tells Columbié that he is wary of Swedish and Brazilian recognition of the MPLA government because the Swedes could acquire “influence…over President Neto and other MPLA leaders.” The Brazilian action is seen by the Soviet source as possibly influenced by the United States, since the U.S. knows “it would be fairly easy for the Brazilians to manipulate MPLA leadership.”
| Document 4 | ||
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December 3, 1975, White House Memorandum of Conversation with Chinese Officials, “The Soviet Union; Europe; the Middle East; South Asia; Angola” (Document obtained by National Security Archive, from National Archives Record Group 59. Records of the Department of State, Policy Planning Staff, Director’s Files (Winston Lord), 1969-1977, Box 373). | |
This conversation between President Gerald Ford, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Chinese Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-p’ing demonstrates that high-ranking Chinese officials raised concerns about U.S. entreaties to continue their participation in Angola because of South Africa’s involvement. Vice Premier Teng states, “As I mentioned to you just now, the primary problem is the involvement of South Africa. If you can get South Africa out of Angola as soon as possible, or find some other means to replace South Africa on the southern front, this would be good.”
| Document 5 | ||
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August 11, 1975, Memorandum, “Report about my visit to Angola,” from Major Raúl Diaz Arguelles to Major Raúl Castro Ruz. (Document from the Centro de Informacion de la Defensa de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, CIDFAR, [Center of Information of the Armed Forces]). | |
| English translation of this document | ||
This memo describes meetings between the Cuban representatives and Angolan President Agostinho Neto. In his report to the head of the Cuban Army Raúl Castro, Raúl Diaz Arguelles talks about handing over 100,000 dollars to the MPLA as well as fielding their requests to train Angolans both in Cuba and Angola. Neto goes on to complain about lackluster Soviet aid and expresses his wish to turn Angola into a “vital issue in the fight between imperialism and socialism.” The Cubans agree, and Diaz Arguelles recommends helping the Angolans “directly or indirectly” in their cause.
| Document 6 | ||
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June 27, 1975, NSC Minutes, “Angola” (Document obtained from Gerald Ford Library, NSC Meetings File, Box 2) | |
In a meeting including President Ford, Secretary of State Kissinger, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, and CIA Director William Colby among others, U.S. intervention in Angola's civil war is discussed. In response to evidence of Soviet aid to the MPLA, Secretary Schlesinger says, “we might wish to encourage the disintegration of Angola.” Kissinger describes two meetings of the 40 Committee oversight group for clandestine operations in which covert operations were authorized: “The first meeting involved only money, but the second included some arms package.”
| Document 7 | ||
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November 22, 1972, Memorandum, “The Shipment of Comrades to Angola and Mozambique,” From Major Manuel Piñeiro Lozada to Major Raúl Castro Ruz. (Document from the Centro de Informacion de la Defensa de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, CIDFAR, [Center of Information of the Armed Forces]). | |
| English translation of this document | ||
This document, written by Cuba's famous intelligence operative, Manuel Piñeiro, shows the early Cuban Government contacts with the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) and original MPLA requests for low-level training and logistical assistance in Angola. The memo describes Cuban plans to send a delegation to Angola and Mozambique to ascertain what kind of support Cuba could give to independence struggles in those two nations.
| Document 8 | ||
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November 21, 1967, CIA Special Memorandum, “Bolsheviks and Heroes: The USSR and Cuba.” (Document obtained through FOIA) | |
This report by the CIA's National Board of Estimates describes a low point in relations between Moscow and Havana shortly after Che Guevara’s death. The report begins by bluntly stating, “Brezhnev thinks that Castro is some sort of idiot, and Castro probably isn’t too fond of Brezhnev either.” Much of the tension between the two allies, according to this analysis, has been caused by Cuba’s encouragement of guerrilla warfare in many Latin American countries while the Soviets tried to expand both diplomatic and economic ties with those governments the Cubans were trying to overthrow.
| Document 9 | ||
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November 14, 1965, Letter, Che Guevara to Oscar Fernandez Padilla. (Document obtained from Archivo del Comite Central, [Archive of the Central Committee]). | |
| English translation of this document | ||
In this handwritten letter, Che Guevara, using his code name “Tatu,” the Swahili word for the number three, writes to Fernandez Padilla (code name "Rafael") who heads the Cuban intelligence operations in Dar-es-Salaam. Padilla's unit is providing support for the Cuban presence in Zaire. In his letter, Guevara describes some of the organizational problems that were common in this operation including carelessness with money, and the need for multivitamins and access to a grocery store to avoid malnutrition among Cuban personnel. A week after the letter was written, on November 21st, Cuban troops, including Che Guevara, withdrew from Zaire.
| Document 10 | ||
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October 20, 1963, Memorandum, Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, Cuba, Major Raúl Castro to Majors Flavio Bravo and Jorge Serguera. (Document from the Centro de Informacion de la Defensa de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, CIDFAR, [Center of Information of the Armed Forces]). | |
| English translation of this document | ||
On the eve of the first Cuban military mission to Algeria, Major Raúl Castro, head of the Cuban Armed Forces, writes a memorandum to two of the leaders of the mission with specific rules of conduct for the Cuban troops while in Algeria. Castro stresses extreme self-control amongst the troops, prohibiting alcoholic beverages, or intimate relationships with women; as well as humility, imploring the men to be modest and not “act like experts.” Along with the code of conduct, Castro encourages “complete and absolute” respect for Algerian customs and religion. While Che Guevara looked into possible Latin American operations, Raúl Castro supervised this early operation in Northern Africa.